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IN THE UTAH COUR'i
THE STATE OF fTTAII,

. APPEALS

]

Plaintiff-Respondent,
I

Case No. 9700565-CA

ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS,
Defendant-Respondent.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court o f Appeals h a s jurisdiction of this m a t t e r
because is a n appeal from a court
involving a convictior
i-M,lr

•

? a first-degree o r capital felony.

Utah

(1996).
ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION

Did the lower Court abuse its discretion in failing to al1ow
Defendant

withdraw his plea on the grounds of breach of the plea

agreement?
The standard of review for denial of a motion to withdraw a
whether if clearly appears that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing
Gentry,

797 P.2d 456 (Utah it

11 1

1 " ti P

ill. .i'

ill1!11 i

Defendant's oral Motion

cause.

A. _• 1990).
preserved

for appeal by virtue o*

Withdraw Guilty Plea.

(Transci

September 8, 1997, hearing [hereinafter "9/8/97 Tr.lf] 15.)
TEXT OF AUTHORITIE3
A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon
good cause shown and with leave of the Court.

Utah Code Ann., §

77-13-6(2)(a) (1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case
This is a criminal action against Defendant for Theft, a

Class-A Misdemeanor.
R. Course of the Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Defendant was
charged

under

an

Amended

Information

for

Theft,

a

Class-A

Misdemeanor, arising from the alleged theft of a motor vehicle.
Such plea was entered on or about July 21, 1997.

At the time of

sentencing on September 8, 1997, after various comments made by
counsel for the Plaintiff, which Defendant believed to be a breach
of the plea agreement, Defendant orally moved to withdraw his plea
of guilty. Although the lower Court initially granted Defendant's
motion and set the matter for trial, upon request of the State, the
lower Court reconsidered its decision.
C.

Disposition at Trial Court
At an evidentiary hearing on September 16, 1997, the

lower Court ultimately denied the motion to withdraw plea and
entered judgment against Defendant and sentenced him to serve a

2

term of ninety (90) days in the Iron County Jail,1
D.

Statement of Facts
On July 21, 1997, Defendant entered into a plea bargain

agreement with the State of Utah whereby he pled guilty to Theft,
a Class A Misdemeanor. A written "Statement of Defendant Regarding
Guilty Plea, Certificates of Counsel and Order" (hereinafter "plea
agreement") was prepared, executed by all the parties and filed
with the Court.

The matter, after obtaining a Pre-sentence

Investigation Report, was set for sentencing on September 8, 1997.
(R. 66-72).
Paragraph 11 of the plea agreement provides, inter

alia,

that "the State of Utah has agreed to make no recommendations
regarding sentencing
without comment)."

(i.e. to submit the matter to the Court

(R. 69).

At the time of sentencing on September 8, 1997, counsel
for the State of Utah made certain comments to the Court about the
length of jail time that would be appropriate, as well as whether
Defendant should be allowed a furlough before reporting for his
term of incarceration pursuant to the sentence the Court had
imposed.

At that time, Defendant asked to withdraw his plea of

guilty by virtue of the Statefs breach of the plea agreement, and
the Court granted his motion.
for December 4, 1997.

The matter was then set for trial

(9/8/98 Tr. 6-8, 13-15).

Although, arguably, this appeal is moot since the ninety (90)
day term of incarceration has now been served, as a result of his
conviction of the above offense, Defendant was found to have
violated his probation on other felony offenses and, as a result,
was committed to the Utah State Prison, where he remains.
3

Subsequent to the court hearing, counsel for the State
was successful in bringing the matter again before the Court who
agreed

to

hold

an

evidentiary

hearing

regarding

withdrawal of plea on the oral motion was appropriate.

whether

a

(9/8/98 Tr.

20-23) .
At the evidentiary hearing, upon reviewing the videotape
of the 9/8/98 hearing, the Court found that the Defendants request
for time to report for sentencing did not relate to the sentence of
the Court and that comments about the length of jail time to be
served was merely a clarification and not intended to prejudice the
Defendant.

(Transcript of September 16, 1997 hearing 13-16).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

POINT I:

The State's counsel clearly made comments regarding

the appropriate term of incarceration for Defendant and regarding
whether he should be granted a furlough prior to reporting for his
term of incarceration.

Both such comments materially breached the

plea agreement, and it was an abuse of discretion by the trial
court not to find that such breach constituted good cause for
Defendant to withdraw his plea.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE THE STATE BREACHED THE PLEA AGREEMENT,
THERE WAS GOOD CAUSE TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO
WITHDRAW HIS PLEA
As a general rule, the lower court has discretion whether
State

to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
P.2d 456, 457 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State
4

v.

v. Gentry,

Vasilacopulos,

797
946

P.2d 92, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

In Gentry

this Court held that

if the Court fails to find good cause where such good cause exists,
it has abused its discretion. Gentry,

797 P.2d at 457. Moreover,

the Utah Supreme Court has held that in exercising such discretion,
the courts should,
withdraw

in general, "liberally" grant motions to

State

pleas.

v.

Gallegos,

738 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah

1987). See also Santobello

V. New York,

Specifically, the Gallegos

court stated as follows:

404 U.S. 257, 268 (1971).

The entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of
several important constitutional rights, including the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the
right to trial by jury, and the right to confront
witness. Because the entry of such a plea constitutes
such a waiver, and because the prosecution will generally
be unable to show that it will suffer any significant
prejudice if the plea is withdrawn, a presentence motion
to withdraw a guilty plea should, in general, be
liberally granted.
Id.,

at 1041-42 (footnote omitted).
The appellate courts of this State have yet to determine

whether

a breach

of a written plea

agreement

by

the State

constitute constitutes good cause to withdraw a plea. However, the
lower Court apparently determined that such was good cause when it
initially granted

Defendant's motion.

The Supreme Court of

Maryland, in a case factually similar to the case at bar, has
likewise

held

that

if

a

prosecutor

agrees

to

make

no

recommendations as to sentence and then violates that agreement,
the Defendant may have his guilty plea vacated.
272 Md. 249, 322 A.2d 527, 530 (1974).
U.S. at 262; Darnell
84 (1966).

v. Timpani,

Miller

v.

See also Santobello,

State,
404

68 Wash.2d 666, 414 P.2d 782, 783-

Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Alvarado,
5

442 Pa. 516, 276

A.2d 526, 529 (1971), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a
promise to make no comment or recommendation at sentencing means a
"commitment not to make any damning or even potentially damaging
statements at the time of sentencing."
In the instant case, the State has failed to show any
prejudice that would result if Defendant were allowed to withdraw
his plea. Any delay in trial affects Defendant equally as much as
the State.2
comment

The State, in its plea agreement, agreed to make no

whatsoever

at the time of sentencing.

Instead,

it

commented both on the way jail time should be calculated (which
could result in prejudice to Defendant by serving additional time)
and by further objecting to a furlough prior to the commitment of
Defendant.
Any attempts by the State to "clarify" when time should be
computed for Defendants sentence constituted a "comment" regarding
the meaning of the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report and was at
least potentially damaging to Defendants position at sentencing.
The State will likely argue that a delay in commencement of
the commitment in no way affected the sentencing, because the Court
had already imposed its sentence, and it was merely a question of
when such sentence would commence.

The date the sentence would

commence was of importance to Defendant, however, because it would
allow him to handle financial and other matters that he would not
defendant1s motion may have been untimely under Section 7713-6(2) (b) in that it was not made within thirty days of the entry
of his plea; however, such untimeliness, if any, was not raised by
the State and, therefore, should not be considered by this Court.
State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 475-76 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
6

be able to handle it the commitment were to commence immediately.
(9/8/97 Tr. 5-6). In summary, then, an immediate commitment would
have imposed a greater "punishment" on Defendant than if the
temporary furlough were allowed.

Thus, the lower Court's finding

that the State's arguments in support of its objection to the
furlough were harmless and did not affect the "sentence", were
unfounded.
Giving Defendant the benefit of the doubt, and based upon
the holding in Gallegos,
construed

the

plea

the lower Court should have liberally

agreement

and

found

a

breach

thereof.

Accordingly, it should have found that such breach constituted good
cause and allowed Defendant to withdraw his plea*
CONCLUSION
Based upon the above discussion, this Court should
reverse the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment of the lower Court
and remand for the purposes of entry of a not-guilty plea so that
the matter can proceed to trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j£^5^day of May, 1998.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this

of May, 1998, I mailed,

first class, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of
the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to:
Ms. Jan Graham
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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ADDENDUM
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SCOTT M.BURNS (#4283)
Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
REGARDING GUILTY PLEA,
CERTIFICATES OF COUNSEL,
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS,
Defendant.

)

Criminal No. 971500112

)

Judge J. Philip Eves

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT REGARDING GUILTY PLEA
I, ROBERT EDGAR FRJJS, the above-named Defendant, under oath, hereby acknowledge
that I have entered a plea of guilty to the offense of THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor, contained in
the Amended Information on file against me in the above-entitled Court, a copy of which I have
received and read, and I understand the nature of the elements of the offense for which I am pleading
guilty. I further understand the charge to which this plea of guilty is entered is a class A
misdemeanor, and that I am entering such plea voluntarily and of my own free will after conferring
with my attorney, Floyd W Holm, and with the knowledge and understanding of the following facts:
1.

I know that I have constitutional rights under the Constitution of Utah and the United

States to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I have entered a plea of

guilty, or to a trial by the Court should I elect to waive a trial by jury. I know I have a right to be
represented by counsel and that I am in fact represented by Floyd W Holm.
2.

I know that if I wish to have a trial in Court upon the charge, I have a right to be

confronted by the witnesses against me by having them testify in open court in my presence and
before the Court and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross-examined by my attorney. I
also know that I have the right to have witnesses subpoenaed by the State at its expense to testify in
Court upon my behalf and that I could, if I elected to do so, testify in Court on my own behalf, and
that if I choose not to do so, the jury can and will be told that this may not be held against me if I
choose to have the jury so instructed.
3.

I know that if I were to have a trial that the State must prove each and every element

of the crime charged to the satisfaction of the Court or jury beyond a reasonable doubt; that I would
have no obligation to offer any evidence myself; and that any verdict rendered by a jury, whether
it be that of guilty or not guilty, must be by a unanimous agreement of jurors.
4.

I know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of the United States that I have a

right against self-incrimination or a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify
in Court upon trial unless I choose to do so.
5.

I know that under the Constitutions of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury

or by the Court that I would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court
of Utah for review of the trial proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs ior such
appeal, that those costs would be paid by the State without cost to me, and to have the assistance of
counsel on such appeal.
-2-

6.

I know that it 1 wish to contest the charge against me, I need only plead "not guilty"

and the matter will be set for trial, at which time the State of Utah will have the burden of proving
each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must
be unanimous. I know and understand that by entering this plea of guilty, I am waiving my
constitutional rights as set out in the preceding paragraphs and that I am, in fact, fully incriminating
myself by admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered.
7.

I know that under the laws of Utah the possible maximum sentence that can and may

be imposed upon my plea of guilty to the charge identified on page one of this Statement, and as set
out in the Amended Information, is as follows:
(A)

Incarceration in the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility for a period
not to exceed one (1) year; and

(B)

Fined in any amount not in excess of two thousand five hundred
dollars ($2,500), plus an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge;

I further understand that the imprisonment may be for consecutive periods if my piea is to more than
one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another
offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my plea in the present
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. I also know that I may be ordered
by the Court to make restitution to any victim or victims of my crime.
8.

I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of guilty does not mean that the Court

will not impose either a fine or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made
to me by anyone as to what the sentence will be if I plead guilty or that it will be made lighter
because of my guilty plea.

-3-

9.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to induce me

to plead guilty, and no promises, except those contained herein, have been made to me. I know that
any opinions made to me, by my attorney or other persons, as to what he or they believe the Court
may do with respect to sentencing are not binding on the Court.
10.

I know that under the laws of Utah should I desire to move the Court to set aside my

guilty plea entered in this case, I must do so within thirty (30) days of the entry of the plea or my
right to do so will be lost. I further understand that a plea of guilty may be withdrawn only upon a
showing of good cause and with permission of the Court.
11.

No promises of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty except that I

have been told that if I do plead guilty, the State has agreed to file an Amended Information therein
charging me with THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor, as opposed to the original charges of
RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Second-Degree Felony; DUI, a Class B Misdemeanor; and
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class B Misdemeanor. Moreover, I am aware that
the State of Utah has agreed to make no recommendations regarding sentencing (i.e. to submit the
matter to the Court without comment). No other promises have been made. I am also aware that
any charge or sentencing concessions or recommendations for probation or suspended sentences,
including a reduction of the charge for sentencing made or sought by either defense counsel or the
prosecutor are not binding on the Court and may not be approved or followed by the Court.
12.

I have read this Statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I

understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this
Statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct.
13.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.

14.

I am

years of age, I have attended school through the

grade, and I can

read and understand the English language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication,
or intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea was made. I am not presently under the influence
of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants.
15.

I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of

understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease,
defect or impairment that would prevent mefromknowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering
my plea.
16.

I have discussed the contents of this Statement with my attorney and ask the Court

to accept my plea of guilty to the charge set forth in this Statement because I did, in fact, on or about
February 3,1997, in Iron County, State of Utah, knowingly and intentionally exercise unauthorized
control over the property of another (Crestview Cadillac), said property having a value in excess of
$300.
DATED this

M^

day of July, 1997.

_M
ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS
Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS, the Defendant named above,
and I know he has read the Statement, or that I have read it to him; and I discussed it with him and
believe he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent.
To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the

crime and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated, and these,
along with the other representations and declarations made by the Defendant in the foregoing
Statement, are accurate and true.

Is,

FLOYDWHOLM
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against ROBERT EDGAR
FRIIS, Defendant. I have reviewed the Statement of the Defendant and find that the declarations,
including the elements of the offense and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct
which constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercions
to encourage a plea have been offered to the Defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained
in this Statement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the Defendant for the offense for which the
plea is entered and acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest. Finally, I have discussed
the terms of this agreement with the victim and the investigating agency in this case, and said victim
and agency folly support and agree with said plea agreement.

SCOTT M. BURNS
Iron County Attorney

-6-

ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement of Defendant Regarding Guilty Plea
and the foregoing Certificates of Counsel, the Court finds the Defendants plea of guilty is freely and
voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that Defendant ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS' plea of "guilty" to
the charge set forth in the foregoing Statement be accepted and entered.
The foregoing Statement of Defendant was signed before me this _
of July, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

J. PHILIP EVES
District Court Judge

-7-
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff;

)

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE,
AND COMMITMENT

)

vs.

)

ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS,

)

Criminal No. 971500112

)

Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendant.

The Defendant, ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS, having enteicd a plea of guilty io the offense of
THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor, on July 21,1997, and the Court having accepted said plea of guilty
and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report prior to
sentencing, and upon completion of said report, the above-entitled mater having been called on for
sentencing on September 8,1997, in Parowan, Utah, before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, and the
above-named Defendant, ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS, having appeared before the Court in person
together with his attorney of record, Floyd W Holm, and the State of Utah having appeared by and
tlirough iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns, and the Court having reviewed the presentence
investigation report and having further reviewed the file in detail, and thereafter having heard
statements from the Defendant and his attorney, and the Court being fiilly advised in the premises
now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, to wit:

JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, ROBERT
EDGAR FRJJS, has been convicted of the offense of THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor, and the Court
having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be
pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is
adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, ROBERT EDGAR FRHS, and pursuant to
his conviction of THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor, is hereby sentenced to a term of incarceration
for a period of ninety (90) days, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Iron
County Sheriff.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant shall commence serving the term of
incarceration set forth above (90 days) on September 19,1997, at 9:00 a.m.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that nofineand no restitution shall be imposed by the Court.
COMMITMENT
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS, and
deliver him to the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility in Cedar City, Utah, there to be kept
and confined in accordance with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment.
DATED this c*-*

w

day of September, 1997.

J^PHILIP EVES
District Court Judge
-2-

